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Garry Kasparov: I was born on the wrong side of the Berlin Wall. When I visited Ronald Reagan’s Ranch Center in Santa Barbara, California, in 2016, they had a big piece of the wall Reagan helped tear down on display. I joked that I didn’t recognize it because I had only seen the other side.
Back in 1987, I was speaking at an event in West Germany, and I told people that I was sure that the collapse of the Berlin Wall was inevitable and would happen very soon. They looked at me like, Okay, that’s crazy. But he’s young, 24, and he’s just a chess player. What does he know? And they stopped listening. This was before Ronald Reagan’s famous “tear down this wall” speech in Berlin, which was around a month later.
Another famous four words from a U.S. president also concerned Berlin. President Harry Truman said We stay in Berlin, to promise that U.S. forces would protect and supply West Berlin during Stalin’s siege of the city in 1948: the famous Berlin airlift. Not to put myself in the company of U.S. presidents, but I was inspired by Reagan and Truman in my own Berlin speech at Aspen Institute on October 14th, 2015.
I titled it “Four Words to Change History.” I said, “We must remember that societies do not have values. People have values. If we want our values to succeed, we must protect the people who hold them wherever they are, whoever they are. And if I may finish with my own four words here today: Fight for our values.”
From The Atlantic, this is Autocracy in America. I’m Garry Kasparov.
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My guest is Mathias Döpfner, joining me from Berlin. He’s a journalist who is now the CEO of the multinational media and technology company Axel Springer. He leads dozens of publications in many countries, including Politico and Business Insider in the United States and Bild and Die Welt in Germany, among many others. He is German, and it is a German perspective I was after from him. Many around Europe and the world are waiting for Germany to lead. So will it?
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Kasparov: Hello, Mathias. Thank you very much for joining our program.
Mathias Döpfner: Hello, Garry.
Kasparov: Quick question. Are you at your office now?
Döpfner: Absolutely, at my office in Berlin.
Kasparov: So I want to let the listeners know that this office, that was built by the founder of your company Axel Springer, if I’m correct, in 1966, it’s literally next to the former Berlin Wall that divided—physically divided—the free and unfree world back during the Cold War. So it was standing on the edge of democracy and autocracy. Not anymore, now. But not to put too fine a point on it: It is precisely what this show is about. So from this perch, tell me—what do you see as a principal threat to democracy in Europe? And what is Europe’s place in this ever-changing world today?
Döpfner: Yeah; thank you, Garry. So sitting here in our kind of historic headquarters building, it’s a golden skyscraper right at the edge of the former wall and death strip. Just to illustrate that: When we literally cross the street in order to get to the new part of our headquarters, we cross a row of cobblestones, and these cobblestones are marking exactly the spot where the wall used to be. So this building literally was built as a lighthouse of freedom, as the founder called it. It turned out to be the new center of a reunified Berlin and a reunified Germany, with a lot of euphoria around the idea that freedom prevails, the open-society model prevails.
And at the moment it looks quite different, and it looks different from a factual base. If you check the results of Freedom House analysis and other comparable analyses of the state of freedom, then you see a freedom recession globally for many years. There’s never been such a significant downgrading of formerly free countries to partly free and formerly partly free countries to unfree. But also most of the centrist democracies are in relatively weak shape, whereas autocratic authoritarian systems pretty systematically achieve their goals and gain ground.
So it’s quite a challenging time for the open-society model. And on top of that, we have internal issues. I think we should not only look at the external threats and the autocrats and dictators, we should also look at ourselves and what we need to do differently in order to succeed.
Kasparov: Agreed. So let’s look deep inside. Let’s start with Germany. So 35 years ago there was a reunification. Many believed, you know, it would be beyond our wildest dreams and it would never happen. It did happen. Has unification happened in minds as well as geographically and politically?
Döpfner: Well, Garry, I’m not a diplomat, so I speak very openly. Also if it’s about my own country. I remember very well when the wall came down. A prominent publisher here in Berlin, Wolf Jobst Siedler, said it’s going to take at least a generation until we will see real integration of mindset, and until we see real unification psychologically and mentally. I thought this was totally exaggerated, that it was going to be a question of two, three, five years. It’s now more than a quarter of a century, and still there is quite a significant divide. There is still an East and West Germany, and you see that on many levels also politically. At the same time, we also have to realistically see that all together—with regard to management and the economy—the reunification was a success and went well, and there is a lot of prosperity. And if you go to the East German cities and compare them, how they look like 30 years ago—uncomparable. And there is so much progress and wealth and positive development that we should also not be too negative about it. We should be also a bit thankful.
On the third level, and that I think is the most important one, Germany has developed, for many various reasons, a degree of complacency that I find more and more dangerous. And I think we have to really take that as a warning call to do things differently. And here, of course, there is a lot of hope with regard to the new government that is in place and that could, with strong leadership, solve the problems—most importantly, the problem of an economic turnaround. And with regard to migration, we also need a very significant shift conceptually and with regard to execution. I think those are the two most important topics, but that requires really bold decisions in leadership.
Kasparov: After unification, Germany has become the largest country in Europe, and it’s a driving engine of the European Union. But considering the, historical, call it liabilities or historical baggage, so, is Germany ready now—after so many years, 80 years since the end of World War II—is Germany ready to overcome this sense of historical guilt and to become a positive force to take a lead?
Döpfner: That’s a very interesting question, Garry. Because truly I think this phase of German history during the Third Reich, the Holocaust, and everything that led to this unparalleled horrors have deeply traumatized the country and in a way discredited the term leadership and the idea of leadership and even the idea of excellence, to a certain degree. The unfortunate misunderstanding of this chapter of German history is that not only you should never be involved in any form of military conflict; pacifism is a naive idea. The second horrible misunderstanding is that leadership and excellence is almost something negative. It associates with Germany needs to lead the world and needs to dominate the world. And the irony is that almost everybody in Europe and in the entire world is waiting for German leadership and thinks Germany needs to lead it—needs to lead Europe together with other countries. And that leads me to the second element of your question. Are we able to overcome the traumas? Hopefully not in the sense that we forget about it. I think what happens should never be forgotten and we should learn from that. But we should learn the right lessons.
And the right lessons are always: Do everything to defend the free-and-open-society model. And if we lead with good intentions and in the spirit of partnership together with others, then I think that is the most credible and the most successful mindset. I think apart from a right value set and system of coordinates, the most important thing that the new German chancellor needs to prove and needs to have is courage. To move fast, to act and not only speak, and to really tackle the two biggest priorities: economy and migration.
Kasparov: Yeah, I think of one of Winston Churchill’s famous phrases: that no success is final, no failure is fatal, what counts is the courage to continue. Because he has challenges both domestically and internationally. So you mentioned economy and migration. Now, do you consider energy independence as a part of the economy?
Döpfner: Very big issue. Here, the elephant in the room is nuclear energy. Will this government go back to nuclear power plants? That is the big question that everybody is asking at the moment in Germany, because an energy policy that is based on windmills or only solar is not going to solve the problems and is not going to provide the energy that you need, also with regard to excellence in artificial intelligence, so—
Kasparov: But let us again remind our audience that Germany made the decision to walk away from nuclear energy. What, back in 2011, yes?
Döpfner: Yeah, I remember. I can share an anecdote with you. I remember very well. I was invited to the Russian Embassy by the Russian ambassador with a group of editors of Axel Springer for lunch. And it was a coincidence that the lunch took place on that very day, and each person had a glass of vodka at the table. And before we started, the ambassador was raising the vodka glasses and said, Let me cheer to the German chancellor. The decision to drop out of nuclear energy will be very good for Russian energy and for the Russian economy. And people looked a little bit irritated and basically thought it’s a joke, but then they realized it was the—
Kasparov: It was greatest gift to [Vladimir] Putin.
Döpfner: Right, exactly.
Kasparov: Because that made Russia the sole supplier or this major supplier of energy to Germany—and via Germany to many other European countries.
Döpfner: I personally think it was one of the most irresponsible decisions of German governments in postwar history, because not only did it create the biggest damage to the German economy and the German energy sector, but more importantly, it has basically strengthened and financed the Putin that we have to deal with since then—and the Putin who then invaded Crimea and who then invaded Ukraine. And the money is the main resource that has funded that war. It’s quite a sad case, and it shows again why trade policy, economic policy, is so directly intertwined with geopolitics and security politics. And that’s why this whole decision to drop out of nuclear energy is way, way bigger than just a topic in the context of coalition scenarios or energy policies. It goes way beyond it.
Kasparov: Now, the German political map today—again, I’m old enough to remember when Germany was in a classic two-party system, you know, social Democrats on the central left, and Christian Democrats on the right. Now it’s a mess. But the danger is that we could see in Germany as everywhere, both in America and Europe, the growing strengths of the radicals on the far left and far right. So the German political map today has a great number of MPs and growing strength of both AfD—Alternative für Deutschland, far right—and also two far-left groups. So how do you describe this new—the political realignment? And how dangerous is the threat of these combined attacks on democracy from the far right and far left? Obviously the far-right group is much bigger. They won more than 20 percent in the last elections, and I think now, their popularity level stands at nearly 25 percent. So just give us just a little bit of a sense of this very dispersed political field. So the political map is quite messy for the traditional two-party system.
Döpfner: This phenomenon, I think it is simply the result of failed and unsuccessful centrist policies and the lack of credibility of centrist political leaders. So if we tackle that problem, we should first look at what did the centrist parties, what did the older parties, the political establishment do wrong? And why feel people, the need to look for alternatives and shift more to the extremes? Why are they seduced by the easy solutions? And I think that is also a pretty global phenomenon where the extremes are getting stronger. The center has made mistakes and should start with self-criticism. Now, concretely to Germany, both extremes are very dangerous and have some ideas that are very anti-constitutional and particularly dangerous with regard to geopolitics and the future of open societies.
Kasparov: Yeah. I want to just talk a bit more about AfD, Alternative für Deutschland. Because the other far-right groups and parties like in France—Marine Le Pen’s—or Nigel Farage [and the] Reform Party in Great Britain—they refuse to deal with AfD. They believe it’s too far right and it has an open nostalgia for Nazi Germany. So can you tell us more about the nature of this party and the threat it can represent to German democracy and to European integration? Because it’s, of course, it’s against a united Europe.
Döpfner: I think indeed the foreign-policy concepts, the geopolitical consequences, of that are by far the biggest threat that this party provides. The admiration for strongmen and autocratic countries—like almost Russia, but also China and others—reflect a totally different idea of society, a different idea of leadership. And also the consequences geopolitically would be horrific, I think, for the open-society model and the world order that we are discussing today. That’s why I find it particularly hard to understand why this movement is so much more popular in the eastern states of Germany than in the western part of Germany. And that is actually counterintuitive, because you should think like other Eastern European countries—who basically experienced Soviet communism and the ruthlessness of that system—that should lead to a lot of realistic and skeptical expectations with regard to future relationships with Russia, and the future influence of Russia or dealing with China. But the opposite seems to be true. And that is, for me, very hard to explain. Honestly, Garry, I have no very convincing explanation for that.
Kasparov: Let’s talk about sympathy to AfD not from the east, but from the west. Actually the far, far west—in D.C. So it seems there are quite a few fans of AfD in Trump’s administration. Definitely it’s J. D. Vance, who openly supported not just AfD but almost every far-right political group in Europe that was fighting in the elections to get into power. So how do you explain that?
Döpfner: I think it would be particularly negative for the United States, because in large parts of the party there is a deeply rooted anti-Americanist approach, a deeply rooted anti-capitalist approach. And I would be curious how that would play out with regard to the transatlantic relationship. I mean, just take the very concrete request or proposal: no American weapons on German ground. That’s funny. Putin will like that, but that’s not good for Germany. Now, maybe some people in America may say, Well, that’s nice for America, because we have lower expenses in that context. But I think the price that the United States would pay in the long term for that would be enormous, would go up, definitely. Because a Putin that is encouraged by such a move would not stop in Ukraine. He would go further.
Kasparov: So am I hearing you saying that without America, without American leadership, the global democracy will be in peril and may collapse?
Döpfner: Yes. I think it’s a very nice but slightly naive idea that now the big historic opportunity is, since America is sending a lot of disturbing and surprising signals, Europe could do it alone or could do it better. It’s not going to work.
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Döpfner: The challenges of China, the challenges of Russia, and the challenges of Islamist dictatorships are much too big in order to be solved by Europe alone, and I would even go that far— they are also way too big than being solvable by the United States alone.
Kasparov: We’ll be right back.
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Kasparov: But let’s look at this geopolitical chess board: The United States, China, and of course Russia is still there. So it’s a relatively small economy, but you have nukes, [an] army, you have a crazy dictator who made war as an engine of his power. And what is Europe here? Because I think one of the problems between Europe and America and now the way, I think, the Trump administration is viewing Europe is—Europe is divided, is too weak. And Germany is not ready to play the leading role to unite Europe—and to make it speak with one voice that could put Europe at this negotiating table and make, you know, European opinion, European power, to be counted. Do you believe that Europe still has its potential, again led by Germany, to make herself relevant?
Döpfner: The short answer is yes. Europe is a sleeping beauty. It’s just a great continent with wonderful countries and a beautiful, probably the most attractive, lifestyle in the world. But it’s also sleeping. It’s sleeping because it developed a very dangerous degree of complacency. Now the question is: Can that be changed? And here, my take is more optimistic. I think what is happening at the moment in the world is very disturbing. And it can be the beginning of the end—it can be the beginning of the end of the open-society model, of the idea of a free rules–based society, of democracy, of the rule of law, of human rights. And we will have a very different world order. Now, being at the verge of that, seeing the dangers and facing a lot of volatility in the United States and a lot of rigor and aggression in nondemocratic superpowers like China, I think it has the potential to really be the healthy wake-up call—the healthy wake-up call for democracy in the open-society model, and the healthy wake-up call for Europe. And then I think that would be a reawakening of Europe. aAnd suddenly in 10 years, the world can look completely different. People may say, Wow, what a shift of labor, excellence, know-how, value creation to European countries. What a different world where these open societies stick together and build strategic alliances in the economy, but also in the field of defense and security. So I truly think we are at a pivotal moment where both is possible: the beginning of the end, or the healthy wake-up call that starts a new decade, a new century, where Europe plays a more important and a better role.
Kasparov: You said, I think, sleeping beauty. For me, that doesn’t constitute any strength. So it is basically waiting for a courageous prince to wake her up with a magic kiss. Is it a sleeping beauty or a sleeping giant?
Döpfner: That’s a very good point. It’s a beautiful giant, let’s call it. But in any case—
Kasparov: That’s an interesting mixture.
Döpfner It’s—in any case, we definitely agree that it’s sleeping at the moment, but I also agree with your criticism of beauty is not enough. And I think with the right injection of energy and ambition and aspiration, it can be a new player, a new giant.
Kasparov: Three and a half years of war in Ukraine. You can hear them from Berlin. Was it not enough to wake Europe up? So how come that in three and a half years, Europe—Europe!—has provided less help for Ukraine than North Korea for Russia? You’re still contemplating your next moves. You don’t want to see that Putin is at war with Europe. It’s a kind of hybrid war. He has been openly interfering in elections in Germany, in Romania, in France, in Britain. So everywhere. What else do you need to wake up? And let’s again go back to Germany—can Germany just take a lead? Three and a half years have been lost, so what does come next?
Döpfner: First of all, Garry, I totally agree with your analysis. Secondly, I don’t have a very good answer why it’s still sleeping. I wrote a text a few days after the invasion in Ukraine and said, This is now a moment where the West has to act, where NATO members have to act. Whether it’s under Article V or not. But this is the moment where we have to show strength, because only strength and military deterrence is avoiding an escalation and is avoiding a bigger and long-lasting conflict. And if we don’t do that, the price is going to be higher. I was criticized as a warmonger; I was criticized to risk a nuclear escalation. And so on.
So from today’s perspective, it feels quite sad, because I still think—and I’m still deeply convinced—had we acted faster and more determinedly, we could have avoided a large degree of what has happened since then. And now we are in a much worse place. Nevertheless, I think it is not too late, and if you just take a percentage of budgets that NATO members and the West is basically investing in order to stop Putin, it is so minor. It is so minimal compared to what Putin is investing. And that leads me to the very simple result: If we would want to stop that, we could stop it. And there is, I don’t know—it’s a mix of opportunism and naivety. And also a wrong narrative, that only if we are nice to Putin and if we are not focusing too much on military force, only then we can calm him down, which is so wrong. It is misreading so much the mind of almost all totalitarian leaders, and particularly of Putin, who is basically testing the West and always seeing how far can he go. And the further we let him go, the more he will do, and the higher the price is going to be. So it is already late. It’s not too late, but we wasted a lot of time.
Kasparov: Again, realistically, so whatever we say about NATO and its historical role, the role has played over 75 years. I mean, it’s dead now. It’s not functioning. And definitely, the next three-plus years, while Trump is in office, nobody expects NATO to be what it used to be—the organization that we relied upon for decades. I share your optimism that, you know, eventually there will be some kind of new alignment or realignment in European-American relations. The global democracies will get together. But that’s in the future. But currently, we have the war. So can Germany, in your opinion, lead this new defense alliance as the prototype for the future version of NATO—to make sure that this war can be won, or at least Ukraine can survive the Russian onslaught? And, what are the limits for Germany in building such an alliance? How realistic is it to envision the German role as an engine for this defense coalition?
Döpfner: Can Germany do that? Yes; Germany can do that. Will Germany do that is more complex. And here I think there is one psychological reason why there is a risk that is not happening. And I mentioned that already. It is history. It is a bit this fear of taking military leadership. I mean, the world was fearing for decades, for good reasons, for German military initiatives, for military ambitions, in a way for military leadership. And I think that is also a very, very kind of poisoned ground.
And that may lead to more reluctance than we need, and that could be a reason why it’s not happening or why it’s not happening fast enough. But if I may, let us also not forget the possibility that something happens that may be surprising from today’s perspective, but psychologically not unlikely. And that is the more Putin plays with Trump, the more he publicly embarrasses Trump—gaining time, not making real concessions, not sticking to agreements, the more Donald Trump could feel provoked. And if Putin continues to do that, then I think Trump could surprise everybody by really changing his mind completely. And then we could have a totally different situation, not only psychologically, but also militarily.
Kasparov: Oh, I’m afraid you’re a dreamer, Mathias.
Döpfner: Maybe I am a dreamer, yeah. But do you really think that it’s realistic that Trump leaves the field as the loser, having been kind of outsmarted by Putin and basically saying, Okay, I resign. You won, Vladimir. I just leave the battlefield as a loser. For me, it’s also hard to imagine, simply psychologically.
Kasparov: Yeah. But Trump’s psychology, it’s just, it’s always to turn any failure into a victory. Okay then; now just going to the end of our conversation. So let’s concentrate on what Germany could, should, and hopefully will do. So will Germany move on with the rearmament plans? So investing heavily in its military-industrial complex, building new weapons, and becoming a military powerhouse once again?
Döpfner: I think the likelihood is very high, if you just look to the kind of changes in social behavior. Just a few years ago, people from the weapon—from the defense industry were not even invited to dinner parties. Today, they are stars of dinner parties. Everybody talks to them. They are perceived as heroes. They are perceived as guards of freedom and democracy. So the mindset has really fundamentally changed. And also the number of start-ups that are dealing with drones, and dealing with new technologies of defense, is skyrocketing. People are preparing for that, and everybody sees the need for that. So the likelihood that that mindset changes is pretty high.
Kasparov: So do you think that it’s realistic that Germany will also build its strong army that will become the core of this military barrier against potential Russian aggression?
Döpfner: Mmm, that’s a long shot. I don’t know how developed the willingness of German people is to defend their country. I think it’s already tough to defend our country, and even tougher to defend Europe. But maybe I have a slightly—maybe my take is too negative here.
Kasparov: Yeah. No, but it’s very important to hear—because I’m afraid, you know, I share your pessimism here. All these guns, all these shells, all these drones: They are not too effective without the willpower behind it. Without manpower behind it. And it seems to me that Germany is yet to cross this road. So it’s like from West Berlin to East Berlin. So just from this historical guilt, you know, from this peace-mongering to war reality. Can you imagine just, you know, that as a part of this coalition, Germany may develop nuclear weapons to deter Russia?
Döpfner: Unlikely.
Kasparov: Unlikely. So that means that Germany will always depend on other countries, because the successful deterrence is not—against Russia—will not work without a nuclear umbrella. So who will provide the nuclear umbrella during Trump’s years? France, Britain? How do you think Germany will manage it?
Döpfner: Maybe France and Britain will play a bigger role. That’s a possibility. But again, I think without America, it’s going to be very tough. That’s why it is in our very vital interest to keep a healthy relationship with America, regardless whether we like the government or not. It’s an overarching paradigm, I think, for Europe and for Germany.
Kasparov: So just a very final question. So you just give us the next three years, just for the next three years of the Trump administration: What will be the ideal outcome? So for us to dream about 2028— from the German perspective?
Döpfner: Strong German leadership leads to conceptual priorities. One is to lead Europe in military strength and support in Ukraine, in defense, in order to limit Putin’s aggression. That will impress the United States, because a stronger Europe will be taken more seriously. And a Europe that does more for its own defense will be more credible as a partner to negotiate deals on other levels.
And the second thing will be changed in Germany and in Europe. And that is: that we reach out to America, agreeing on a mutual strategy, trade strategy, toward China, defend that strategy together at the negotiation table. Achieve a much, much better deal with China that strengthens Europe and America. That weakens Putin, that limits China, that strengthens the democratic world. That will be the beginning of a new, prosperous era for America. America First from an American perspective, and a stronger Europe, Europe First, from a European perspective. But based on mutual values excelling together. That would be the most optimistic outcome that would strengthen the open-society model and freedom and democracy. But Garry, honestly, that is the ultimate degree of optimism that I can develop at this stage. Let’s work on that. Let’s hope for it. But let’s not count on it. Prepare for the worst in order to get positively surprised.
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Kasparov: Yes, we can prepare for the worst, but it’s very important to have a vision. And thank you very much for laying down this positive vision, Mathias. And I hope that at least part of this vision will be realized soon.
Döpfner: That would be something.
Kasparov: And first of all is, of course, you know, for Ukraine A) to survive, B) to win. And eventually the Putin regime to collapse and Europe to become a real geopolitical player: to wake up from its sleep and to become, as you said, a beautiful giant on the world stage.
Döpfner: Wonderful. I totally agree.
Kasparov: Yes. Thank you very much, Mathias; thank you.
Döpfner: Thank you, Garry.
Kasparov: This episode of Autocracy in America was produced by Arlene Arevalo. Our editor is Dave Shaw. Original music and mix by Rob Smierciak. Fact-checking by Ena Alvarado. Special thanks to Polina Kasparova and Mig Greengard. Claudine Ebeid is the executive producer of Atlantic audio. Andrea Valdez is our managing editor.
Next time on Autocracy in America:
Viktorija Čmilytė-Nielsen: We are an example that a country can live. It can have a great standard, can have free speech, can have human rights in quite a short time. And I think that is the painful thing for the Kremlin. They do not want to see successful countries from the former empire. Because it might lead their people to think that there is another way. There is another track for their country, as well. And that is definitely very scary for the regime.
Kasparov: I’m Garry Kasparov. See you back here next week.
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